Since trading costs are related to a firm's cost of capital, if firms are allowed to reduce trading costs by paying fees to a market maker, should they? In this study, we examine a growing trend in global stock markets to allow listed firms to independently negotiate and enter into contracts with liquidity providers to make markets in their stocks. Our specific focus here is the 2002 decision by the Stockholm Stock Exchange to allow listed firms to employ liquidity providers. We find for a sample of stocks that entered into such an arrangement, a significant improvement in market quality with a decline in quoted spreads and an increase in quoted depth throughout the limit order book. We also find that both inter and intraday volatility decline following the entry of committed liquidity providers for these stocks.
stock, but typically firms cannot negotiate the services and fees paid to specialists. Examples of specialist markets are the NYSE, Toronto Stock Exchange, and Italy's Nouvou Mercato. Markets may also choose to set maximum limits on certain market quality measures. For example the Toronto Stock Exchange has "target" spread widths and Nouvou Mercato limits spreads to 5%. However, such affirmative obligations are costly and exchanges need to devise systems to compensate the designated liquidity providers. On the NYSE such compensation comes in the form of certain privileges for the specialist that are not available to other traders combined with allowing these specialists to trade on privileged information. 4 Even with this advantage studies find that specialists on the NYSE use the profits from trading in liquid stocks to subsidize losses incurred in trading illiquid ones (Cao, Choe and Hatheway (1997.) While this system works well on the NYSE's floor based system (not without its share of critics), electronic markets have struggled to find an alternative mechanism. 5 Without such compensation, market intermediaries may ignore the illiquid securities that have limited potential for profit. Unfortunately, these are the securities that most need and benefit from the presence of liquidity providers (Grossman and Miller (1988) provide the theoretical basis for this result while Neal (1992) empirically verifies their hypothesis). Recently, exchanges in Europe have adopted a system whereby the listing firm contracts with a liquidity provider to maintain a market presence and guarantee an agreed upon minimum level of market quality. The firm directly compensates the liquidity provider for makers. 4 On the NYSE, specialists are the only traders with complete knowledge of the book. Even the adoption of Open Book by the NYSE did not eliminate this informational advantage. Open Book allows interested parties to pay to see price and depth away from the inside, however stop orders, stop-limit orders, and the hidden portion of orders is not seen. 5 A TSX discussion paper on "Market Making Reform," (August 2002) brings up this issue in, "Market making models in other jurisdictions, including the NYSE specialist model and the NASDAQ dealer model provide market makers with certain informational advantages and greater control of order flow, which contribute to the magnitude of capital provided for market making activities. TSX is seeking input concerning possible changes to the market making model to facilitate capital increases for market making activities in the interest of enhancing liquidity and the effectiveness of central price discovery." these services. 6 These designated liquidity providers then function much like "passive" specialists in that they have affirmative obligations to fulfil without any informational advantages. In this respect, they resemble most closely the specialists envisioned by Glosten (1989) who are still able to improve market quality for stocks with high risk of adverse selection due to their longer trading horizon.
The value of a specialist has also been empirically studied by a number of authors. Madhavan and Smidt (1993) , Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) , and Madhavan and Panchapegesan (2000) study various issues related to the performance of NYSE specialists. Neal (1992) , Mayhew (2002) and Anand and Weaver (2003) examine the value of a specialist in the options market. A number of other studies compare execution costs and depth on market maker and specialist (NYSE) systems (for example Grossman and Miller (1988) , Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997), and Bessembinder(1999) ).
Two recent papers are closely related to our study. Nimalendran and Petrella (2002) find an improvement in market quality on the Italian Stock Exchange after specialists were introduced for thinly traded stocks. However, they limit their study to the NYSE framework which is not directly applicable to this paper, as the "specialist" in our study differs in very fundamental ways from the NYSE specialist. Nimalendran and Petrella (2002) also do not analyze the effect of specialist introduction on the cost of capital for the firms entering into a market-making arrangement for their stock. In the second paper, Mann, Venkataraman, and Waisburd (2004) examine the impact of firms on the Paris Bourse employing a liquidity provider. Mann, Venkataraman, and Waisburd (2004) focus on the benefits of a designated market-maker to stocks traded in a call auction environment on the Paris Bourse. They find support for the Glosten (1994) hypothesis that a designated market-maker may prevent market failure. They also find that this decreased probability of market failure is associated with a statistically significant positive return around the adoption of a liquidity provider, which supports the link between trading costs and required returns.
Our study complements Mann, Venkataraman, and Waisburd (2004) in that we focus on stocks that are traded in a continuous market. Therefore, our focus is not on market failure but on the impact of market-maker adoption on conventional measures of market quality such as spreads, depth and volatility. We also link changes in these measures to changes in the cost of capital of the firm. Further, we also add to this stream of literature by explicitly analysing the terms of the contracts between firms and the market-makers responsible for providing liquidity. We can thus study the economic rationale of these arrangements as well as the interaction between contractual minimum market quality standards and the payments required for meeting those standards.
In this paper we examine the 2002 decision by the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE) to allow listed firms to contract with liquidity providers. This decision was aimed at enhancing liquidity in small and mid-cap stocks and in particular to establish a two-sided market for these stocks throughout the trading day. Like the Paris Bourse, the SSE sets maximum spread widths and minimum depths for all firms choosing to contract with a liquidity provider. Also similar to the Paris Bourse, firms may contract for better terms than the exchange minimums. Unlike the Paris Bourse, all firms on the SSE trade in a continuous market with an opening and closing call auction. This allows us to examine typical market quality measures such as spread and depth for our entire sample, thus allowing us to draw inferences that may be applied to other continuous auction market such as the NYSE.
We find that firms reap quantifiable benefits of their decision to contract with liquidity providers for market quality. Specifically, quoted dollar and percentage spreads experience a decline, which is economically as well as statistically significant. Quoted depth increases at the inside quotes as well as at other price points in the book (four price levels away from the inside market). This improvement in market quality is robust to changes in market conditions conventionally known to impact transactions costs. The increased depth is better able to absorb liquidity shocks hence resulting in lower return volatility. We also find some evidence that traders take advantage of the improved depth by submitting larger order sizes as seen by an increase in trade sizes. Lower costs of trading also result in higher trading volume for the concerned stocks. We also analyze the link between transaction costs and returns and find that prices increase following the contracting for market making services. Consistent with Venkataraman and Waisburd (2004), we find cumulative abnormal returns to be statistically significant. We also find that the abnormal returns are directly related to the improvement in transaction costs.
We examine LP firm trading profits and find no evidence that they obtain compensation other than the contract fees. Finally, we examine the relationship between contract costs to the contractual improvement in market quality, firm specific characteristics (such as volatility and price), and existing relationships with LP firms. Results of a regression analysis suggest that all three groups of factors are priced in the contracts. Our findings suggest that the decision to contract for market making services.
Including listing, can increase firm value and hence should be treated as any other project a firm may consider.
In the next section we discuss some institutional details of the Stockholm Stock Exchange.
Section 2 describes the data used in this study. This is followed by our results, and the conclusion.
Institutional Details
The Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE) is owned by OM Technology, a firm that supplies the trading platform for 27 exchanges around the world. The SSE uses an electronic limit order book trading system called SAXESS. All trades entering the limit order book are executed against limit orders, however there is some facility for trades to be executed upstairs and crossed on the system. Over 80% of all trades occur against the book though. Swedish best execution regulations require that small and medium size trades executed off-exchange be executed inside the prevailing quoted spread.
During the period of our study, all stocks trade continuously from 9:30 AM to 5:20 PM. 7 There is also an opening and closing call auction for all stocks. Like other exchanges that represent the only 7 The opening time has been changed to 9:00 AM after our study period ended. market in their country, the SSE has several "sections" for stocks with differing liquidity levels. Until recently, there was no official market making in stocks. Therefore inside quotes were determined by public limit orders. This led to occasional wide spreads, one-side markets, or no quotes whatsoever.
Obviously, these problems were a function of trading interest in the stock.
To remedy this situation for less liquid stocks, the SSE began during 2002 to allow firms to contract with firms to make markets in their stocks. They call these firms liquidity providers. The exchange sets maximum spread widths and minimum depths, but firms are free to require narrower spreads or larger depths. The SSE monitors the performance of the liquidity providers based on the contract.
Data
We obtain from the SSE, the list of firms that contracted liquidity providers between September 2002 and March of 2004. There are 50 such firms which are listed in Table 1 . The date the LP began making a market in a firm's stock is later than the contract date. The SSE determined the actual date that each liquidity provider began making a market for each stock and provide us with that list. Table 1 contains the date that each firm began receiving market making services for their stock from liquidity providers. Liquidity providers begin making markets for firms in our sample on 38 different dates over a 21 month period. The dispersion of dates greatly reduces the probability that any observed changes are due to market wide factors. Therefore, we do not construct a control sample of firms that did not adopt liquidity providers.
The SSE provided us with data for a period surrounding the LP effective date for each firm. We use data for the 20 trading days before and after the adoption of an LP for each firm. The adoption date is not included in either sample. We use two types of data in this study. The first is a data set that contains snapshots of the first five price levels of each firm's limit order book at 15 minute intervals throughout the day. The data contain the price and size at five price levels on each side of the book.
The SSE employs an opening and closing call auction for all stocks. We only include data during the continuous trading portion of the market from 9:30 AM to 5:20 PM.
We also use trade records for our stocks. Similar to the TAQ database, each trade record contains the time stamp of each trade along with the price and volume. Unlike TAQ, each record also contains the identities of the buyer and seller as well as whether the trade occurred outside the quoted inside spread. Knowing the identities of the parties involved in each trade allows us to directly observe the contribution of liquidity providers, allowing us to make finer observations as to the potential benefit of LPs. The data also contain an indicator as to whether each trade is buyer or seller initiated.
Finally, we obtain from the SSE copies of the contracts that each firm entered into with their liquidity provider firm. Firms are not required to reveal the terms of the contract, but a large number do. All but one of the contracts contains the maximum spread width that the LP firm will provide. The amounts are listed in the last column of Table 1 next to the average percentage spread for each firm for the 20 trading days prior to the start of a LP. Comparing these two columns reveals that some firms will experience a very large reduction in spread while others will not. In particular, MSC Konsult has an average percentage spread of over 16% in the 20 days preceding contracting with an LP, while Bejer AB has a pre spread of 2.5% and a contract spread of 4%. This suggests that some firms may be concerned with an overall reduction in spread width, while others may be more concerned with contracting for a more stable spread width.
Results

Overall Market Quality
At the heart of the liquidity provider contract is an agreement between the LP and the firm to narrow their spread and increase depth. We therefore begin our analysis by examining these two measures. The quote data that we use for this study is based on snapshots of the limit order book every fifteen minutes throughout the day. Thus, we calculate the simple average spread for each stock and then average over all 50 stocks in our sample. We calculate quoted spread in Swedish kroner (SEK) as well as a percentage based on the midpoint of the spread. The contracts specify the spread limit based on the asked price. As mentioned earlier, companies are free to enter contracts that provide better terms than the exchange set maximum. ( 1) where, for firm i, p t is the price in the trade at time t and q t is 1 (-1) if the trade is buyer (seller) initiated.
Percentage effective spread is then 2(ψ + λ). Examining Table 2 , we find that average effective spread declines from 1.37% to 0.88%. This constitutes a statistically significant decline of almost 50 basis points in effective spreads. The results for spread-with following the adoption of a liquidity provider mirror the results other authors have found for firms switching from NASDAQ to the NYSE.
The next measure we examine is quoted depth. We measure depth in both the number of shares and in currency units. The number of shares on the bid and ask sides are summed to yield total depth. Because a 500 share increase in depth is a small increase for a listed firm with a normal depth of 10,000 shares, but a large increase for a normal depth of 1,000 shares we examine absolute as well as relative (percentage) depth changes for each firm. Examining Table 2 for inside depth reveals a statistically significant relative increase of over 35% following the introduction of liquidity providers. This suggests that liquidity providers at least partially supplied the additional depth. We will return to this later. But first, we examine the amount of depth away from the inside. Recall that our data contain depth on each side of the market for the inside as well as four additional levels away from the inside. We sum the depth offered and sought for the four price levels away from the inside and calculate the change after the adoption of liquidity providers. Table 2 lists the results. We find that similar to inside depth, aggregate depth away from the inside increased significantly, on a relative basis, following the contracting of liquidity providers. Brennan and Subrahmanyan (1996) show that Equation 1 also allows for estimation of an alternative measure to market depth, Kyle's lambda. Kyle's lambda is an inverse measure of liquidity, thus a decrease following the adoption of a liquidity provider indicates an increase in liquidity. 8 Examining Table 2 we find that indeed on average lambda decreases by more than half from 0.56 to 0.22 and, consistent with our results for relative quoted depth, the change is statistically significant.
The observed increase in depth found for our sample should act to absorb market shocks leading to lower volatility. Accordingly, we next examine changes in volatility for our sample. We define volatility as the standard deviation of 15 minute returns based on quote midpoints.
9 . We will show later that for less than 1% of the possible 15 minute time slots in our study there is not a two-sided quoted spread. In these instances the return would be for a period exceeding 15 minutes. To mitigate the effects of these data points (and because there are so few of them), we only include those periods that have an opening and closing two-sided spread for a 15 minute period. Examining the change in volatility given in Table 2 , reveals that intra-day volatility dropped from 7.88% to 5.76%, a statistically significant decline. This is consistent with our hypothesis that the observed increase in depth reduces the impact of price shocks.
A number of studies have shown that spread width is inversely related to trading activity.
Therefore, we expect measures of trading activity to increase following the beginning of market making activities by liquidity providers. Accordingly, we calculate several measures of trading activity and report the results in Table 2 . We find that the average daily number of trades increases from 9.18 to 14.82 and that the increase is statistically significant. Although the average daily number of trades is only 9.18 in the period prior to market making activities, it must be remembered that the firms in our sample contract with liquidity providers specifically because they are small firms with low interest among investors -a fact that is faced by many firms around the world.
We find that average daily trading volume, measured in both number of shares and Swedish kroner, exhibits statistically significant relative increases. Combining together the daily volume in the post period with the reduction in percentage spread illustrates the large savings in transaction costs enjoyed by investors after firms adopt a LP. We find that based on a 250 day trading year, the annual cost savings to investors for these 50 firms is in excess of SEK74,762,149 (US$10,680,311.) 10 These cost savings are non-trivial. This increase in trading volume is accompanied by an increase in average trade size. Larger quoted depth should allow traders who trade in size to increase their trade size rather than breaking up larger orders. We therefore estimate the change in trade size for each firm and report the average result in Table 2 . Consistent with our conjecture, the average trade size increases significantly from 3,072 to 4,884 shares.
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The final market quality measure reported in Table 2 is the percentage of time that a firm's stock has a two sided quoted spread and defined as the percentage of 15 minute snapshots (during continuous trading) that have both a bid and an ask. We find that on average, the percentage of time with a two sided quote increased insignificantly from 99.6% to 99.8%. 10 We multiple the average percentage effective spread reduction against the average daily Swedish Kroner (SEK) volume in the post period to get a daily SEK cost savings. We then multiple by 250 trading days then by the number of sample firm. We convert to US$ by assuming an exchange rate of 7 SEK to 1 US$. 11 Multiplying the average daily number of trades by the avergae trade size will not equal the average daily trading volume. That is because
Paying for Market Quality
We next test whether the improved market quality we find is due to factors other than the introduction of liquidity providers. For example Stoll (1985) shows that relative spread is inversely related to price and trading activity, and directly related to volatility. Therefore, we perform regressions of the form
to control for confounding factors, where:
S is the mean spread (quoted or effective) for firm i in period t (pre or post);
Price is the mean closing price for firm i during period t:
Volume the mean daily share volume for firm i during period t; σ i.t , is the standard deviation of intra-day return for firm i during period t; Dummy i.t is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the period is post, otherwise zero. If the observed decrease in quoted spreads can be attributed to the introduction of liquidity providers, we would expect the parameter estimate for Dummy to be negative and significant.
The results are reported in Table 3 . We find that the parameter estimate for the Dummy variable is of the expected negative sign and statistically significant at acceptable levels for both quoted kroner and percentage spreads. The dummy variable is of the expected sign but not significant for percentage effective spreads. This suggests that our findings are not due to confounding factors but instead are associated with the introduction of liquidity providers for firms in our sample.
Impact of Spread Reduction on Returns
A number of authors have shown that liquidity and stock prices are related.
12 Therefore, the fact that we observed a reduction in spreads, suggests that prices should increase following the adoption of liquidity providers by firms. However, in our particular context, the improvement in liquidity comes at a cost to the firms. Thus, it is possible that liquidity providers negotiate a fee equivalent to 12 See Amihud and Mendelson (1986) , Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) , Amihud (2002) , Jones (2002) , and the benefit to the firm making it a zero net present value decision. It is then an empirical question whether these investments enhance the value of the firm.
To examine the impact a liquidity provider on firm value, we conduct an even study using the date the LP begins providing market making services as the event date. 13 As is now standard in event studies we estimate abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs.) The event window is 5 days before to 10 days after the introduction of a liquidity provider. We calculate daily abnormal returns using the market model with the return on the OMX benchmark index employed as a proxy for the market return. Parameters are estimated, using daily data, over the period 1-125 to t-6, where t is the date LP services began. The Scholes and Williams (1977) betas are estimated to remove biases arising from thin trading. Table 4 has the results for the abnormal return on each day in the event window as well as the cumulative abnormal return.
Examining Table 4 reveals that the average return on the day LPs begin making markets in a firm's stock is a positive 1.08%. All but one abnormal daily return is positive on the days following the LP start date. The CAR for day t+10 is a statistically significant 6.19%. This provides strong support for the notion that the market reacted positively to the start of market making services and firm values increased as a result.
To examine whether this apparent increase in firm value is related to the reduction in transaction costs noted in Table 2 , we perform the following regression on each day t's CAR:
where, CAR i is the cumulative abnormal return on day t and the independent variable is the relative Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) . 13 For most firms the date LP services began coincides with the announcement date but for a few firms the announcement date is a significant number of days before. For a few firms the official announcement came after the liquidity provider began his services. Therefore we use the date change in percentage quoted spread from the pre to post period. Extant literature predicts that the parameter estimate of θ 1 (t) is negative, indicating that reductions in spread have a positive effect on the stock price. Examining the column labelled Change in Spread reveals that indeed there is an apparent relationship between the reduction spread and the increase in firm value, consistent with existing literature.
Liquidity Provider Contribution and Profits
We next examine the direct contribution of liquidity providers to the observed improvement in market quality. Our data do not allow us to identify the source of quotes in the limit order book.
However, we can identify liquidity providers on trade data, so we concentrate our analysis on the contributions liquidity providers make to trading activity. We find that for 14 firms, liquidity providers did trade in the firm's stock before contracting to make a market for the firm. This fact alone, attests to the improved market quality provided by liquidity providers. The results for trading activity by liquidity providers are contained in Table 4 .
Panel A examines the trading activity of liquidity providers after contracting for the 14 firms that had no previous activity. Examining Panel A reveals that liquidity providers added just over 16,000 shares to the average daily volume for these 14 firms. This represents an average of 15.42 trades a day for an average trade size of 1,612 shares. The number of trades per day and the average daily kroner volume are statistically significant at acceptable levels. Turning to Panel B, we find that on average liquidity providers increase their contribution to a lesser degree to share volume than to that found for firms in Panel A. In particular, liquidity providers add 7,741 shares to the average daily volume observed in the post period for these 36 firms. The change in the daily number of trades for firm's with liquidity provider activity both pre and post is a statistically significant 6.31. The average trade size involving liquidity providers is reduced by half following the start of market making activities. services began as our event date.
Coupled with the increase in the number of trades involving the liquidity provider, suggests that they are most beneficial to small traders.
Unlike NYSE specialists, SSE LPs have no informational advantage over other market participants.
14 Since they have no informational advantage, we would not expect them to earn excess profits from trading the stock. In other words, we would expect their compensation to arise from what they are paid contractually. To test this hypothesis we estimate the incremental trading profits that LP firms earn in the period following the agreement start date. Our data identify both the buying and selling firm in each trade and whether the tr4ade was buyer or seller initiated. Since we know which firm is the LP for each stock we are able to extract and sign trades involving the LP firm. 15 In particular we estimate two versions of LP firm total trading profits (TP): The results with and without inventory are contained in the last two rows of Panels A and B of Table 5 . Examining the averages not including inventory reveals that LP firms earn trading profits in the days following the start of their services. However there is a large variation in the profits which 14 Even though anyone can pay to see the NYSE book, only the specilaist knows the full amount of liquidity since stop orders and CAP orders, representing nonpublic supply and demand, are not part of the quotes. 15 We do not have identifiers to let us know whether the LP firm is acting as principal or agent. However, if agency trades are uniformed we would expect the trading profits from them to be zero. Tjhus including agency trades in our anaylsis will not assign any bias to our measure. leads to them being statistically insignificant. This is consistent with our hypothesis that LP firms earn no excess trading profits following the institution of market making services. Examining the last row of each panel shows that including ending inventory turns the previously observed profit into an insignificant loss.
Taken together, the findings in this section suggest that some firms may benefit more from contracting with a liquidity provider. This in turn suggests that firms may pay differential amounts for liquidity provision and that the amount may be related to the amount of market quality improvement desired. We will examine this aspect next.
Contract Terms
As mentioned earlier a large number of firms in our sample reported the terms of their contracts to the SSE and they in turn provide them to us. We find that 23 firms reveal not only the maximum spread width and minimum depth each LP firm agreed to provide, but also the negotiated cost of each contract. The 23 firms in this sub-sample are distributed among three different LP firms.
We find variation in contract terms, not only between LP firms but also among firms using the same LP firm.
Panel A of Table 6 displays the frequency of contract terms (spread and depth) for the 23 firms. We see that the distribution of maximum spread widths is fairly even 2, 2.5, 3, and 4%. Of the 23 firms in our sample, 20 explicitly state the minimum depth the LP firm guarantees for the listed firm. 16 We find that eight of the firms agreed to have the LP provide minimum depth of between 1,600 and 2,000 shares while five choose a depth level between 4,000 and 10,000 shares. The remainder chose amounts as little as 800 shares to as much as 40,000 shares.
We next examine the remuneration listed firms agree to pay LP firms for their services (Panel B Table 6 reveals that the average cost for this portion of the contract is 16,000 SEK (about US$2,300) per month. This number seems like a bargain when we consider that overall traders in firms with an LP almost SEK1.5 million a year in transaction costs. There is variation in the contract amounts, though. The maximum fixed portion is 5 times greater than the minimum, suggesting either variation in firm characteristics or differences in negotiating power among firms. We will examine this issue later in the paper.
We next turn to the variable cost portion which is a fee that the firm pays LP firms for each trade in which they provide liquidity. The costs are calculated on a per share or per trade basis. In all cases there is a cap agreed to on the variable portion of the contract. Like fixed costs, there is dispersion among the variable costs, with the minimum being 5,000 SEK and the maximum being three times larger. The total costs row sums together the fixed and variable portion of each contract.
We find that there is a similar amount of variation amount total costs.
We next perform a cost benefit analysis for each firm and aggregate the results across firms.
To do this analysis we first estimate the average daily cost saving for each firm by multiplying its reduction in percentage spread against its average daily Swedish krone volume. The results are contained in the first row of Panel C. We observe that on average investors in these 23 firms save over 11,000 krone a day in transaction costs. Not everyone seems to have benefited equally since the minimum cost savings is only 88 krone while the maximum is over 100,000 krone.
We assume a 20 trading day month and multiply the average daily savings by 20 to get a monthly savings number. From this number we then subtract the total monthly contract cost for the firm. We report the numbers in Swedish krone (US dollars) in the second (third) row of Panel C. We see that the average monthly benefit to investors in excess of contract cost is almost $30,000.
However we find that this number is negative for 6 of the 23 firms, suggesting that not all firms should have contracted with a LP. Alternatively, the LP firm provides benefits to the firm not captured by pure spread reduction.
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The fact that on average firms experience a larger reduction in total transaction costs than it costs to arrange the contract suggests that they view the adoption of an LP as a positive NPV project that will reduce their cost of capital. Evidence consistent with this conjecture was presented in Table 5 which show positive CARs following the start of market making services. As mentioned earlier, the observed dispersion of cost of contracts may be a result of variation in firm characteristics, negotiating power, or may reflect the fact that listed firms pay more to obtain more benefits. To test this hypothesis, we regress contract costs against variables which are indicative of increased benefits provided by LP firms and firm characteristics..
First we might expect that the larger the spread reduction expected from the LP firm, the more they will charge to provide it. We therefore include as one of our independent variables, Contract Spread Improvement (∆%Sprd), defined as the difference between the observed percentage spread prior to the LP adoption date and the maximum spread width agreed to by the LP firm. Since higher contractual minimums for depth require a larger capital commitment on the part of LP firms, we would expect there to be a positive relationship between these this variable and contract cost. The variable Depth i is the contract specified minimum depth
In terms of firm characteristics, we would expect price and volatility to be directly related to the capital commitment of LP firms and thus also directly related to the negotiated contract fee. We therefore examine σ i , defined as firm i's intraday standard deviation of quote midpoints in the pre-LP period and Price i which is the average closing quote midpoint for firm i in the pre-LP period, LP firms may give discounts to firms that they do other business with, for example investment where C i is either the fixed or total monthly contract cost for firm i.
The parameter estimates are listed in Table 7 . In general we find support for all there areas of potential relationship with contract cost. We find a significant positive relationship between minimum depth and both fixed and total costs. Volatility and price are both positively related to both types of costs and only the parameter estimate of volatility and total costs is not significant at acceptable levels. We also find support for the notion that LP firms give discounts to listed firms that they hjave established relationships with. Finally, we find no statistically significant relationship between our proxy for expected profits and either cost measures..
Conclusion
Until recently, firms took a somewhat passive role in the market quality of their stocks. Now firms are becoming more proactive. Firms listing on the NYSE interview several specialist firms before choosing the one to make a market in their stock. However, the firms do not have direct control over the quality of the market made for their stock. NYSE firms pay a listing fee that bundles together implicit market making fees (if any). In some markets (e.g., Euronext and the Nordic Exchanges), firms may directly contract with a firm to provide market making services for its stock. The firm may specify certain market quality parameters such as maximum spread width.
Given that a number of papers have shown that prices are directly related to liquidity, the decision to contract with a liquidity provider is a capital budgeting decision. The question then becomes, is contracting for market making services a positive net present value project? In this paper we investigate these issues and the evidence suggests that the answer to the question is yes.
In particular we examine 50 previously illiquid firms that contracted to have market making services provided on the Stockholm stock Exchange. The market makers are called liquidity providers and firms can set maximum spread widths for their stocks, which may be smaller than an exchange imposed maximum for stocks employing liquidity providers.
We find that spreads narrow by a statistically significant amount following the beginning of market making services. Additional tests suggest that the decrease in spreads is not due to confounding factors. We also find that depth increases, both at the inside and in aggregate for four price levels away from the inside. Accompanying the increase in depth, we find a significant increase in average trade size, suggesting that traders no longer find it necessary to break up their orders to accommodate low market depth.
Also accompanying the increase in depth, we find evidence of a statistically significant decrease in return volatility. The decrease is found following the start of market making activities for both intra-day and inter-day return volatility. This suggests that liquidity providers prevent orders from walking the book, in a manner very similar to that found for NYSE specialists. We also find that trading activity increases following the contracting, suggesting that liquidity providers are actively engaged in trading with public customers.
We investigate this hypothesis, by examining the trading frequency and trade size of liquidity providers before and after the start of market making activities. We find that for seven firms the contracted liquidity provider is not involved in trades in a firm's stock prior to the contract. For these firms liquidity providers are involved in a statistically significant 15 trades per day and add 9,203 shares to the total volume. For firms that do have liquidity provider firms trading in their stocks before contracting with them, we also find a statistically significant increase in the number of trades.
Given the large body of literature that finds a relationship between liquidity and stock prices, we examine abnormal returns and CARs over the period following the beginning of market maker services. We find evidence in support of this stream of literature. In particular we find that the average CAR for 10 days after the contract start date is a statistically significant 6.19% . We find evidence that the CARs are inversely related to spread improvement, suggesting that the CARs are not a result of a market wide trend.
We examine LP firm trading profits and find no evidence that they obtain compensation other than the contract fees. Finally, we examine the relationship between contract costs to the contractual improvement in market quality, firm specific characteristics (such as volatility and price), and existing relationships with LP firms. Results of a regression analysis suggest that all three groups of factors are priced in the contracts.
Taken together our findings suggest that firms may benefit from taking a proactive role in the market making of their securities and that this decision is no different than other projects a firm faces. Traditional depth is measured as the sum of shares offered at the ask and sought at the bid. The depth measures are sampled only at times where a two-sided market exists. Reported is the depth at the inside as well as for the four price levels away from the inside. The Glosten and Harris methodology listed above also allows for the estimation of an inverse verse of liquidity, Kyle's lambda (λ), which is reported. Return volatility is calculated for15 minute returns based on quote midpoints.
For intra-day volatility only 15 minute intervals for which a mid-quote exists at both ends are included.
The daily number of trades, trading volume, and trade size are self-explanatory. We also measure the percentage of time that there is a two-sided (both a bid and ask) quote. The percentage of time is based on the number of 15 minute intervals with a two-sided quote, divided by the total number of 15 minute intervals in the sample period (pre or post). Data are averaged by firm and then across firms.
For each measure, we list the pre and post firm averages as well as the absolute and relative change.
Tests of significance of the difference between pre-and post-spread values using a paired t-test are in italics.
( This table reports This table examines specify the minimum spread width in round lots. Ten also specify the minimum depth in shares. Panel B reports the mean, median, minimum, and maximum for the monthly costs specified in the contracts.
All have a fixed monthly cost component. Nineteen firms also have a variable cost component which specifies that listed firms will pay the LP firm a fee per trade that the LP is involved in as principal. All 19 place a cap on the maximum variable cost of the contract. Total costs sum the fixed and variable components. Panel C compares the total maximum cost of the contracts to the monthly benefits defined as execution cost savings. The first row of Panel C lists the daily average execution cost savings after the firm adopted a LP in Swedish krone. Also listed is the difference between monthly benefits (based on a 20 day month) and the total monthly maximum contract cost, expressed in both Swedish krone and US dollars. The final row contains the relative benefit level to the monthly cost.
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18 The maximum spread width listed in the contract for all 50 firms is listed in Table 1 . where C i is the monthly cost (either fixed or total) for firm i; σ i is firm i's intraday standard deviation of quote midpoints in the pre-LP period; Price i is the average closing quote midpoint for firm i in the pre-LP period, ∆%Sprd i is the observed average percentage spread for firm i in the 20 trading days before employing an LP less the maximum percentage spread width listed in the contract; Depth i is the contract specified minimum depth. Already i is a dummy variable assigned the value 1 if the LP firm traded the stock in the pre-period, otherwise zero Finally, IncProf i is a proxy for expected LP trading profit defined as the incremental profit in the post period. For firms already trading the stock in the pree period, incremental profit is defined as post period trading profit less the pre period trading profit.
For firms that did not trade the stock in the post period, it is simply the post period trading profit.
t-statistics are in italics and significance levels are indicated with asterisks. 
